Editorial: Liberty of Conscience
In: A journal of church and state: JCS, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 157-164
ISSN: 2040-4867
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In: A journal of church and state: JCS, Band 5, Heft 2, S. 157-164
ISSN: 2040-4867
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 58-84
ISSN: 1552-7476
It has often been argued that, notwithstanding his commitment to the authoritarian state, Thomas Hobbes is a champion of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience: namely, the freedom of citizens to think whatever they like as long as they obey the law. Such an interpretation renders Hobbes's philosophy more palatable to contemporary society. Yet the claim is incorrect. Alongside his notion of "private" conscience, namely, Hobbes develops a conception of conscience as a public phenomenon. In the following, it is argued that this inconsistency serves the purpose of deception: it holds out the possibility of dissent while making it impossible to utilise. Arguably, moreover, this is the proper hermeneutical approach to take to Hobbes's inconsistencies in general. Indeed, said inconsistencies ought to alert contemporary normative theorists to the instability of the "minimal" version of liberty of conscience attributed to Hobbes: Hobbes himself, namely, shows that it is insufficient.
In: Political theory: an international journal of political philosophy, Band 39, Heft 1, S. 58-85
ISSN: 0090-5917
In: The review of politics, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 247-276
ISSN: 1748-6858
John Rawls claims that his system of political liberalism represents the "completion and extension" of liberty of conscience, a grand solution to the problem of religious diversity that accompanied liberalism's emergence in the early modern world. I argue that such a claim cannot withstand historical scrutiny, that Rawlsian liberalism instead represents aretreatfrom the commitments that drove liberal tolerationists. Rawls's political liberalism forces individuals with non-mainstream comprehensive doctrines either to change the doctrine to fit Rawls's conditions of publicity; to manufacture a "public" justification for comprehensively derived political stances; to seek to change the parameters of public debate through, for example, civil disobedience; or to advance comprehensively derived views only so long as public reasons follow in due course. The first two of these solutions run counter to the historical development of liberty of conscience, and the third fails due to Rawls's pervasive emphasis on stability. The fourth misrepresents the nature of moral reasoning and comprehensive doctrines themselves. In conclusion, I argue that underlying Rawls's liberalism is a belief-action split that has historically suppressed religious liberty and, more troubling, a type of repression that undermines the very notion of comprehensive doctrines.
In: The Liberal Archipelago, S. 74-118
In: The Liberal Conscience
In: Harvard Law Review, Band 135, S. 267
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In: The review of politics, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 247-276
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: Journal of human development, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 337-357
ISSN: 1469-9516
1 sheet ([1] p.) ; Probable date and place of publication from Steele. ; Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.
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In: The MIT Press Ser.
In: Christianity and the Laws of Conscience: An Introduction, eds. Helen Alvare & Jeff Hammond, Oxford: OUP, Forthcoming
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In: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie: ARSP = Archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy = Archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale = Archivo de filosofía jurídica y social, Band 108, Heft 4, S. 500-517
ISSN: 2363-5614